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ABSTRACT
In defense of anti-essentialism, pragmatist 
Richard Rorty holds that we may think of all 
objects as if they were numbers. I find that 
Rorty’s metaphysics hinges on two rather 
weak arguments against the essences of 
numbers. In contrast, Plato’s metaphysics 
offers a plausible definition of essentiality 
by which numbers do have essential 
properties. Further, I argue that Rorty’s 
argumentative mistake is mischaracterizing 
Plato’s definition. I conclude that Plato’s 
definition of “essential” is a robust one 
which implies that many properties, beyond 
those we might intuitively think of, can 
count as essential properties of objects.
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NOTE: THE HEADINGS WILL ALL BE NUMBERED WITH ROMAN NUMERALS
I. INTRODUCTION
The overarching project of Plato’s Phaedo is to offer an account of 
the immortality of the soul, prompted by Socrates’ imminent death. 
To construct this argument, Socrates is pressed by his interlocutors to 
defend the existence of abstract objects like the soul, the Good, and 
Beauty. To do so, Plato asserts the existence of entities called Forms. 
Though he is not explicit in Phaedo about the nature of the relationship, 
Plato suggests that Forms are related to properties of material objects 
despite not being the same as the objects. For example, despite 
having hotness as a property, fire is not the same entity as “the hot” 
itself.1 Further, Plato describes how objects that contain a particular 
Form cannot take on the properties of the opposite Form without 
perishing—that is, a flame cannot admit the form of the Cold.2 This 
suggests that the properties of objects to which Forms are related are 
properties that are essential to the object: without such properties or 
being related to the Form in the same way, the object would no longer 
be itself. This view of Forms makes Plato out to be a metaphysical 
essentialist; his theory of Forms implies that objects have natures which 
can be described by unchanging, abstract properties.
In stark contrast to Plato’s essentialism, American pragmatists, 
such as Richard Rorty, broadly reject any appeals to metaphysical 
essential natures, preferring a metaphysics where all properties of 
objects are merely external relations—that is, the property is external 
to the object itself because properties are really describing something 
about the object which is useful for “human needs or consciousness 
or language.”3 For a pragmatist like Rorty, the sentence, “X is blue,” 
communicates that it is useful to think of X as blue rather than 
describing anything intrinsic to the object X.4 As Rorty tells it, one 
motivation behind such a pragmatist metaphysical project is to do away 
with distinctions like “subject versus object” and “mind versus body,” 
which have stoked seemingly irresolvable disputes throughout the 
history of Western philosophy.5 More broadly, Rorty’s move towards 
pragmatism is responsive to the linguistic turn in the nineteenth 
century; pragmatism acquiesces to the worry that our knowledge of 
things, in themselves, is fundamentally altered by the language with 
which we capture that knowledge.6 Implications of Rorty’s pragmatism 
1 Plato, “Phaedo,” in Plato: Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1997), 103c8-d3.
2 Plato, “Phaedo,” 104c1.
3 Richard Rorty, “A World without Substances or Essences,” in Philosophy and 
Social Hope (Westminster: Penguin Books, 1999), 50.
4 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 51.
5 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 47.
6 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 50.
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include the obliteration of the correspondence theory of truth, because 
pragmatists instead posit that truth is a matter of social utility; further, 
pragmatism entails that ethics is reducible to mere norms. 
To sketch out the broad, metaphysical picture that his pragmatist 
view entails, Rorty suggests that his readers “think of everything 
as if it were a number,” because, as he argues, numbers are not the 
type of thing which have essential natures.7 If Rorty is incorrect and 
numbers can have essential properties, then his entire anti-essentialist 
metaphysical theory becomes significantly less plausible—both because 
he is substantively incorrect that no object can have essential properties, 
and because the picture of the world he takes to be the most compelling 
reflects the opposite of what he believes. 
Contra Rorty, in Phaedo, Plato asserts the existence of essential 
properties of numbers by defining a theory of Forms that can cause 
certain essential, non-relational properties in particular objects, such as 
numbers, which instantiate them. I outline Plato’s account of numbers 
as having essential properties, and I argue that Rorty’s objections—that 
all properties of numbers are really relationships between the number 
and other numbers and that numbers have no essential natures—
ultimately fail, in large part because Rorty mischaracterizes Plato’s 
definition of “essential.” I finally argue that there might be even more 
types of essential properties than those Plato suggests, by arguing that 
some scalar relations between particulars can also be essential by the 
provisional definition of “essential” that Plato gives in Phaedo.
II. NUMBERS IN PLATO’S PHAEDO
Plato begins his argument by describing the relationship between 
Forms and the objects which instantiate their properties. He writes 
that, “it is through Bigness that big things are big … smaller things 
are made small by Smallness,” thereby suggesting that Bigness is an 
essential property of big objects, because they were “made” to be that 
way by the form of the Big.8 Then, Plato puts forward the contradiction 
that if a big object was said to be bigger than something else by an 
amount smaller than itself, such as a “man [who] is taller than another 
by a head,” then that man would be made bigger by something small—
the Small would be what causes Bigness.9 This would contradict Plato’s 
initial account of the causal powers of Forms, because the Forms, in 
this case, cause the opposite of themselves—the Form of the Small 
causes the man to be bigger, despite the initial assertion that big things 
are big because of the Form of the Big. To avoid this contradiction, 
7 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 52.
8 Plato, “Phaedo,” 100e5-6.
9 Plato, “Phaedo,” 100e7-01a1.
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Plato concludes that it is not the relative difference or the relationship 
between two material objects which gives them a property like bigness 
or smallness. Rather, it is Forms which cause properties like Bigness to 
appear in objects. In the context of numbers, Plato’s argument implies 
that it is not a comparative relationship between numbers, like addition 
or division for example, that can cause a property like Twoness—
besides the Form of Two, there is no “other cause of becoming two 
except by sharing in Twoness.”10 For example, the number 2 is not 
the number 2 because it is one more than the number 1, or because 
it is half of 4—it is the number 2 because it possesses the property of 
Twoness, which is given by the Form of Two. In so arguing, Plato 
suggests that Forms (such as the magnitude of numbers) are what give 
numbers their properties and that those properties are intrinsic to the 
object, not dependent on comparison to other objects.  
Plato then goes on to explain the apparent contradiction between 
the different relationships that objects can have to other objects. 
Plato reiterates that, “the opposite could never become opposite to 
itself,” because a property will “retreat before [its opposite] or be 
destroyed.”11 Then, Plato characterizes particular instantiations of 
Forms as “something else that is not the Form but has its character 
whenever it exists.”12 For example, the number 3 is not the Odd but 
has the property of being Odd: “it must always be called both by 
its own name [three] and by that of the Odd.”13 Note here Plato’s 
equivocation of the copula: saying that the number 3 is 3 is to state an 
identity relationship between 3 and itself, but also saying that 3 is Odd 
is to apply the propositional description of Oddness to the number 
3. To illustrate how instantiations of Forms will “perish or give way” 
before admitting their opposite, Plato describes how “three will perish 
or undergo anything before, while remaining three, becoming even.”14 
In other words, making 3 even (perhaps by adding or subtracting 1) will 
cause 3 to perish and become 2 or 4; there is no way to make 3 even 
while retaining its three-ness. This suggests, importantly, a definition 
of essential properties of objects: a property of an object is essential if 
replacing that property with its opposite would cause the object to no 
longer be the same object. 
Assuming the existence of forms, one argument against Plato’s 
theory of Forms is that it is unclear what things are Forms and which 
are not, and therefore, it is unclear which of an object’s properties can 
10 Plato, “Phaedo,” 101c4-5.
11 Plato, “Phaedo,” 103b2-3; 103d6.
12 Plato, “Phaedo,” 103e3-4.
13 Plato, “Phaedo,” 104a5-6.
14 Plato, “Phaedo,” 104c1; 104c2-3.
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be said to be essential. For example, Plato discusses the number 3 as 
if it is a particular that instantiates the Form of the Odd in the second 
section of his argument,15 but also refers to things like “Twoness” 
as being an essence of the number 2.16 That raises the question of 
whether numbers are particular objects or are themselves abstract 
entities like Forms. While Phaedo is not particularly explicit about 
this apparent ambiguity, there are ways to reconcile this tension. We 
might hold that individual numbers are particulars, because they are 
instantiations of Forms like the Odd that Plato is committed to and 
that they also instantiate other forms like Twoness. If we think that 
the form of Twoness causes the property of having two elements in 
its instantiations, then this holds for the number 2, because it has two 
elements, each with a size of one. This view still allows us to hold that 
numbers, like 2, are themselves objects that are distinct from their 
Form in the same way that a cup is distinct from the Form of the Cup, 
despite being more abstract than physical objects like cups. Fortunately, 
given that Plato believes in the existence of Forms themselves, he 
would likely also be willing to maintain that individual numbers exist 
distinctly as abstract particulars. 
Another issue with Plato’s argument is his conflation of binary 
and scalar properties of objects. When explaining why the properties 
of objects which Forms instantiate cannot be relational and must 
be essential, Plato uses the example of Simmias being “taller than 
Socrates but shorter than Phaedo” to conclude that Simmias has both 
Tallness and Shortness—which Socrates concludes is a contradiction.17 
However, it is only because Plato seems to hold that Forms are essential 
that there is a contradiction; if we hold that Tallness is a primarily 
relational or scalar type of property (i.e., to say something is tall implies 
that it is tall in relation to other things), then Simmias’ relation of 
tallness does not produce a contradiction. This interpretation of the 
property of tallness is most consistent with how we describe height in 
ordinary language. For example, under Plato’s interpretation of tallness 
as an essential, non-relational property, we could never say that a child 
is tall because they are taller than other children their age (despite 
being shorter than almost all adults). The Platonist might respond by 
bracketing out all properties which seem relational (such as Tallness, 
Bigness, or Warmness) from the set of things that are legitimately 
Forms. However, doing so would mean that Forms are essential, not 
relational, just because they have been so defined and not because of a 
metaphysical fact about their nature.
15 Plato, “Phaedo,” 103-04.
16 Plato, “Phaedo,” 101c5.
17 Plato, “Phaedo,” 102b3-4.
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III. AGAINST RORTY’S ANTI-ESSENTIALISM
It is the force of this final objection that motivates a pragmatist 
response to Plato’s theory of numbers. As part of his broader project of 
sketching out an antiessentialist metaphysics, Rorty suggests we “think 
of everything as if it were a number,” because he holds that numbers do 
not have essential properties.18 Despite only providing two arguments 
against essentialism about numbers, Rorty’s claim that numbers are 
both essence-less and like all other objects in existence has powerful 
implications. To take Rorty at his word would first mean committing 
to the view that no material objects have any essential properties and 
are, only truly describable in relation to other objects. Second, Rorty’s 
view implies that even other entities that are as abstract as numbers—
beliefs, moral maxims, or perhaps even colors, for example—do not 
have essences either; they, too, are mere conventions. Adopting Rorty’s 
view would have powerful implications for the way we as humans think 
about our material, moral, and epistemic roles in the world, to say the 
least. Despite the strength of Rorty’s conclusion, however, I argue that 
his two arguments in favor of it are in fact relatively weak. 
Rorty’s first argument for why numbers, like 17, do not have 
essential properties is that there are many ways to describe 17 in terms 
of operations that can be done on other numbers, but none of them 
seem to capture the essential properties of 17 better than any of the 
other descriptions. Rorty’s second argument is that because each way 
we might describe 17 does specify “all its relations to all the other 
numbers,” a mathematician attempting to describe an essential property 
of 17 would have to refer to arithmetic and set theoretic axioms that 
specify the relations between all numbers.19 However, Rorty holds, 
these axioms do not uniquely describe 17; “they are equally the essence 
of 1, or 2, of 289, and of 1,678,922.”20 
Overall, I am skeptical of whether Rorty’s arguments against 
essentialism constitute actual problems for the essentialist. His first 
argument is that no essential description of 17 exists because no 
description can capture “the intrinsic seventeenness of 17—the unique 
feature which makes it the very number that it is.”21 Rorty’s claim is 
ultimately that essences of objects cannot exist, because no description 
of an object could describe a property that makes it unique from other 
objects. This is a clear conflation of essential properties and unique 
properties. Rorty’s argument is analogous to the claim that an essential 
description of the cup-ness of a cup on my desk must capture the 
18 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 52.
19 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 53.
20 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 53.
21 Rorty, “Substances or Essences,” 53.
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essence of that particular cup rather than a shared essence of cups in 
general. Even if Rorty is correct that essential properties could only 
be true of one object, it is still possible for there to be properties of a 
number, like 17, that are unique to it and essential by Plato’s definition 
of “essential.” For example, every integer has a unique decomposition 
into prime factors, and if that decomposition were different, the 
number itself would have to be a different number.22 But, besides 
Rorty’s conflation, his argument does not pose a significant challenge 
for Plato’s view. Returning to Phaedo, Socrates describes how “two 
and four and the whole other column of numbers; each of them, while 
not being the same as the Even, is always even.”23 Under Plato’s own 
view, Evenness is a Form because it gives the essential property of 
being even to the set of numbers given by the series (2, 4, 6, …), and 
no even number is more even than any other. Forms are general and 
abstract because they cause properties that many different particulars 
may share, and particulars therefore cannot be the same as the Forms 
whose properties they possess. Rorty’s objection is, therefore, resolved 
by Plato’s characterization of Forms as abstract entities which can give 
essential properties to multiple objects.
Ultimately, Rorty is conflating essential properties of numbers 
with unique properties of numbers. Rorty seems to want a description 
of the essence of 17 (i.e., Seventeen-ness) that is completely different 
than Twoness or the essence of any other number, but Plato’s theory 
of Forms does give an account of the essential properties of numbers, 
even if those essential properties are not unique to any one particular 
number. Recall the provisional definition of “essential” given by 
Socrates: that the object could not admit the opposite of its Form 
without perishing.24 By this account, Oddness and Prime-ness are 
essential properties of 17, because 17 would have to be an altogether 
different number to be even or not prime. Moreover, this means 
that even those relations between 17 and other numbers are essential 
relations. For example, 17 is related to 18 by being smaller by 1. If 17 
were smaller than 18 by 2, it would no longer be 17, it would be 16, 
and it would perish. We can infer from this definition that relations 
between 17 and other numbers are internal relations and therefore, are 
essential to Seventeen-ness. 
Rorty’s second argument (against the mathematician who claims 
that set theoretic axioms offer an essential description of 17) is that set 
22 Seventeen is decomposable into 17 * 1. A number, like 20 for example, is 
decomposable into 22 * 5. It could not be the case that 20 decomposes into  
2 * 5, because the original 20 would perish and be replaced by 10.
23 Plato, “Phaedo,” 104b2-3.
24 Plato, “Phaedo,” 104c2-3.
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theoretical axioms apply to all other numbers. In other words, Rorty’s 
charge against Plato’s essentialism is that the theory of Forms needs to 
offer an account of essential properties where different objects cannot 
share any properties in common. This is not a wholly reasonable 
objection, because two different objects can have some properties 
in common and other properties that are different, whether those 
properties are essential or not. For example, even though 17 and 2 
are clearly different numbers and therefore, have some things about 
them that are different, they may also share certain properties by 
virtue of both being numbers. For example, 17 is odd and 2 is even, so 
Seventeen-ness would not be able to admit the Even, while Twoness 
would, which offers a partial explanation of why 17 and 2 cannot be 
the same number. Despite this difference, we can still hold that both 
Seventeen-ness and Twoness both admit the Forms of the Integer and 
the Prime. All this is to demonstrate that distinct objects, and therefore, 
distinct forms, can share some properties while having some properties 
that are different. This disproves Rorty’s objection because, under 
Plato’s view, it can be true that an object has an essential property that 
other objects also have. There is no reason why an essential property 
has to be unique to a certain particular. It is possible for set theoretic 
axioms to be essential properties of the number 17, because if 17 were 
not equal to the set of all natural numbers less than it, then it would 
either be a different natural number or not a natural number at all—
both of which would essentially change the nature of 17.  Therefore, set 
theoretic axioms do constitute an essential feature of numbers. 
Plato’s essentialism about numbers is thus resistant to Rorty’s 
objections. I return, then, to the problem posed earlier in Plato’s proof 
by contradiction—that Plato’s account of Forms must be that the 
properties given by Forms to objects are intrinsic to the object, not 
describing the relationship between it and something else. Perhaps, it 
is even not impossible for relational attributes to be essential qua Plato’s 
definition of “essential.” We can make sense of this by considering my 
previous argument that the relationships between 17 and other numbers 
are essential, because changing those relationships would require us to 
define the number 17 differently—that is, the number 17 would perish. 
With reference to the example of Simmias being taller than Socrates 
yet shorter than Phaedo, this understanding of relations as essential 
would hold that Simmias would not be the same Simmias if he were, 
for example, shorter than Socrates rather than taller. Of course, it is 
slightly harder to find this example to be intuitive, because defining 
personal identity is not necessarily clear. This view requires a fairly 
strong conception of personal identity such that changing one’s height, 
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personality, ethnicity, etc. would constitute a change in a person’s 
identity. 
An antiessentialist might broadly reply to the claim that relations 
between objects could be essential by pointing out the existence of 
relations that, if changed, clearly do not make an object perish. Neither 
this argument for essential relations nor Plato’s essentialism denies 
that there can be properties of objects that are not essential, so the 
existence of non-essential relations between objects does not constitute 
an objection to either theory of essentialism. For example, ownership 
of my sweater is a relationship between me and my sweater, but if 
my sweater were owned by someone else, it would still be the same 
sweater even though it would not be related to me in the same way. 
All that would show is that ownership is the type of relation between 
objects that is internal, and therefore, ownership does not constitute an 
essential property of an object; this supports neither the conclusion that 
no relations are internal nor that relationships cannot be internal.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have outlined and defended a Platonic account of the essential 
natures of numbers. In doing so, I have identified a definition of 
essential properties given in Phaedo and used that definition of essential 
to respond to Rorty’s antiessentialist arguments about numbers. 
That analysis suggests that perhaps even relations between numbers 
are essential to them—though they seem external—and that if it is 
possible for relations between objects to be essential to those objects, 
then essentialism about numbers and properties might even be stronger 
than what Plato suggests in Phaedo. In particular, if it is the case that 
relational attributes can be essential properties, and that essential 
properties must be given by Forms, there are infinitely many possible 
ways to relate an object to other objects. This might imply the existence 
of infinitely many Forms, which would indeed result in a very 
bountiful, yet cluttered metaphysics. 
Some final questions that merit further investigation are what sorts 
of standards might be used to determine whether a particular object 
perishes in the face of its opposite, or by how much an object must 
change to be said to be no longer the same object. Despite these minor 
ambiguities in Plato’s definition, preserving the view that abstract 
entities like numbers can have essential properties gives us cause for 
optimism about the existence of other physical properties like color. 
The highly essentialist contours of Plato’s philosophy, therefore, offer a 
promising and compelling alternate view to pragmatist metaphysics.
112 113 STANCE | VOL. 14 DEFENSE OF PLATONIC ESSENTIALISM ABOUT NUMBERS
Megan Wu is a sophomore at Swarthmore 
College in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As 
a philosophy and mathematics double 
major, she is interested in a range of 
philosophical topics including philosophy 
of emotion, social and legal ethics, 
and logic. Outside of philosophy, she 
is a competitive debater and hobbyist 
photographer.
